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The construct of the book is cogent.
Vlahos outlines his rationale for the
project before he delves into theory and
definitions. He turns to methodology
and research, offering guidelines for fu-
ture scholarship. His content chapters,
“Them,” “Us,” and “Fit,” represent the
substance of the book, encompassing
his analysis on the development of
identity through war. Vlahos’s argu-
ment centers on the idea that the inter-
active nature of warfare creates, and
changes, identity.
In his view, war is a “sacred ritual” that
has been practiced throughout history
and that in turn shapes social identity.
These rituals have semireligious under-
tones and come to represent “human-
ity’s dark liturgy.” Further, war and
interactive conflict shape the identities
of participants, cultivating cohesion,
motivation, and awareness. Vlahos ar-
gues that interaction creates common
narratives and also leads to an acquisi-
tion of legitimacy. Finally, interactive
conflict emerges as a central component
of social identity (both national and
nonstate), which shapes historical hind-
sight as well as future policy decisions.
This book draws on Vlahos’s extensive
knowledge of history. He flows from
the ancient to the contemporary with
ease, drawing on past and present ex-
amples to support his arguments. In the
final chapter, “Where I Come Out,” he
argues that the United States is facing a
crisis of identity in its own sacred nar-
rative, as it transitions from the Cold
War to something new. Finally, he sug-
gests that the social identity of the na-
tion will evolve as it faces the challenges
of the twenty-first century.
Overall, this is an exceptional work of
scholarship on the creation of social
identity, as well as a critique of
American social construct. Vlahos pro-
vides an analysis of inestimable value
based on an impressive grasp of history
and philosophy. Written primarily for
scholars, Fighting Identity is a modern
philosophical treatise on war’s influ-
ence on the development and evolution
of sacred identity. While I recommend
this book for a wide audience, the sub-
tleties of its analysis and the structure of
its argument are complex and elaborate.
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The Cold War was a real war, marked
by complexity. The nation-states mak-
ing up the international system (the
United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union) that emerged in
the wake of the atomic age were com-
pelled to avoid a general conflict and to
protect civilization from nuclear extinc-
tion. As such, a variety of instruments
were utilized by these great powers.
One of those instruments was the col-
lection and analysis of intelligence and,
in particular, nuclear intelligence.
The fact is, Goodman, a lecturer in the
Department of War Studies at King’s
College London, states, that “intelli-
gence was in some ways the cold war
waged by other means.” A little known
aspect of the Cold War involved the
Anglo-American intelligence communi-
ties’ intense focus on the development
of Soviet nuclear weapons. Goodman’s
main contention is that despite the
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strictures of the American Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1946 (the McMahon Act),
which forbade the transfer of American
scientific and technological knowledge
of the atomic weapon to any other
power, Anglo-American nuclear intelli-
gence cooperation nevertheless went
ahead. These two governments used
this intelligence to predict outcomes,
and what proved to be even more suc-
cessful, the detection of Soviet nuclear
weapons testing.
Goodman’s narrative of this effort fo-
cuses on long-distance monitoring, as
well as acoustic, seismographic, and
electromagnetic monitoring of the So-
viets’ nuclear weapons program. This is,
in itself, an excellent insight into the
Cold War nuclear intelligence from
1945 to 1958, an invaluable mirror into
these efforts.
What sets this work apart, however, is
Goodman’s placement of what is essen-
tially one mirror behind another—his
revelation of the strategic implications
of nuclear intelligence-sharing on the
Anglo-American special relationship it-
self, along with the impact of that rela-
tionship on the Soviet Union. To
understand the dynamics involved,
Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking
Glass is worth recalling, as Alice de-
clares that it is like a huge game of chess
that is being played all over the world.
But what of the Soviet Union, the con-
ventionally understood object of all the
covert intelligence monitoring and de-
tection efforts? Goodman answers this
question in his conclusion. He argues
that while extensive literature exists on
the Soviet threat and the American per-
ception of it, these works often deal
with what he calls an alleged “bomber
gap” and “missile gap.” He states that
“both gaps were figments in the
imagination of the U.S. intelligence
community, based in the main on over-
stating the Soviet potential in order to
procure greater funds for military de-
velopment.” While this is a standard
critique, Goodman applies what he
terms “counterfactual history,” a third
look into the mirror behind the mirror.
Counterfactual history, he argues, “is a
tool that often can be used to great ef-
fect. The Soviet Union, it seems, would
never have seriously contemplated war
with the West. Given the American
atomic arsenal, it is also unlikely that
even if Britain had not developed a nu-
clear deterrent, the Soviet Union would
ever have dared risk war.” Goodman
then measures the capabilities-to-
intentions calculus so familiar to stu-
dents of the Naval War College, as fol-
lows: “In the minds of those who
mattered, Soviet capabilities were inti-
mately linked to Soviet intentions.
Therefore, while the Soviets were with-
out the capability to wage war, their in-
tentions were perceived to be far less
aggressive.”
Goodman has produced a definitive
work, in that it validates the United
Kingdom’s unequivocal commitment to
an independent nuclear deterrent, and
by doing so he has given us a seminal
work, a landmark effort in its devotion
to prodigious research and commit-
ment to truthful inquiry.
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